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Abstract 
 
THE IMPACT OF SINCERITY OF TERRORISTS ON COMMITTING TERRORIST 
ACTIVITIES IN TURKEY 
 
By Ahmet Turer, Ph.D. 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University 
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2012 
 
Dissertation Chair: 
 
This study explores the impact of sincerity of terrorists on committing terrorist activities 
in Turkey. The researcher is a Chief of Police in Turkey and has worked in the Anti-terror 
Department for a considerable part of his professional career. His professional experience has 
shown that the more sincere a terrorist is the more violent or heedless the terrorist activity is. 
Thus this research academically and statistically examines this observation and finds that 
sincerity affects level of violence. Attachment and adherence to the terrorist organization turn 
even the characteristically non-violent people into blood seeking terrorists. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Terrorism  
Although terrorism became a popular subject and topic of academic interest after the 
incident of 9/11 in the U.S., the concept of terrorism is neither new nor a diminishing topic of 
public and professional attention of the Turkish government and Turkish National Police. Turkey 
has suffered immensely from terrorism over the last couple of decades, however understanding 
the dynamics of terrorism has not been of much academic concern in Turkey as opposed to 
fighting it through government forces. Academic studies in Turkey on terrorism limited both in 
number and scope mainly focused on reasons of terrorism, the relationship between socio 
economic dynamics and terrorism, the impact of migration on terrorism and finance of terrorism. 
However understanding the motives of terrorism and terrorist actions on an individual level is 
crucial in solving the equation. Thus, this research focuses on one of the important and yet 
unexplored territories within the domain of terrorism: the impact of sincerity. 
There are many reasons for becoming a member of a terrorist organization and just like in 
any other crime motive is a key element in understanding the recruitment of a terrorist to its 
organization. This chapter provides a general overview of the terrorism problem in Turkey. 
Specifically, historical and theoretical backgrounds of terrorism concerning sincerity and its 
relationship to violence of terrorism will be addressed in two sections. In the first section, 
introductory information about terrorism and its history will be presented. In the second section 
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theories that explain sincerity and its relationship to crime and terrorism are examined. 
Terrorism in Turkey 
Turkey came to face the terrorism problem full force during the 1970s. Starting in the 
1960s, Turkey was affected by terrorist activities of mainly leftist groups, which emerged in part 
as the result of resurgence of terrorism in Europe (Laqueur, 1999). Extremist left-wing 
ideologists began to commit terrorist activities after the dramatic failure of the Socialist Turkish 
Labor Party in the election of 1969, which resulted in public disorder and strikes. 
The government was unable to prevent the disorder in the country and lost control. In 
1960, the armed forces took control over by declaring martial law. Military power ruled the 
government for an eighteen month period and civil rule was restored in 1961 (Bal & Laçiner, 
2001).  Laqueuer (1999, p. 31) explains that the root causes of Turkish terrorism was due to the 
rapid urbanization and the resulting unequal distribution of economic resources. This leftist 
movement received support from Bulgaria and the eastern bloc countries. The right used 
religious institutions for the same purpose. During 1978 and 1979, 2,400 political murders had 
been committed. The military took the power over again in 1980 to restore order within the 
country (Laqueur, 1999). 
In late 70’s another face of terrorism demanding separation of south east of Turkey 
appeared using Kurdish population of Turkey. This was mainly in the non-urban areas (Laqueur, 
1999). The Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) was a militant, separatist organization that aimed to 
create an independent Kurdish state in the southeastern part of Anatolia (Button, 1995). 
Although Turkish authorities have argued that there is no Kurdish problem in Turkey, Kurds 
have vigorously demanded more cultural, linguistic, and political rights. However, the reality 
shows that citizens of Kurdish ethnic heritage enjoy full rights as Turkish citizens (Ahmed & 
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Gunter, 2000; Keyman, 2007; Kirisci & Winrow, 1997; Lytle, 1977; MacDonald & O'Leary, 
2007; Taspinar, 2005).  
Terrorist acts have also been committed by extremist religious groups. Such groups have 
been trying to change the secular Kemalist reforms and replace a secular, constitutional Turkish 
state with an Islamic Sharia based state following the Iranian model (Laqueur, 1999). These 
groups enjoyed wide Iranian support and often acted on behalf of Iranian local and regional, 
political and strategic interests. The reaction of Turkish authorities in the past to Islamic terrorist 
activity was limited and thus encouraged leaders of these groups and their sponsors to continue 
escalating violence hoping it will bring down the secular democratic regime in Turkey. In 
Turkey and by many observers abroad, the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) has been considered 
as the main threat to the Turkish state's national unity and defense. 
The Islamic terrorist activity in Turkey dates back to 1960s. As early as 1967 and 1973 
the leaders of Hizb-al-Tahrir (Islamic Liberation Party) were captured for attempting to bring the 
Islamic State Constitution to Turkey.  Islamic Jihad emerged as a real terrorist threat in the 
1980s, following a series of assassinations against Jordanian, Saudi and Iraqi diplomats. In 
October 1991, Islamic Jihad took responsibility for murdering an American military officer and 
wounding an Egyptian diplomat in order to protest the Middle East peace conference held in 
Madrid. For many years, it was thought that this organization was a Lebanese Shiite terrorist 
group, however it was later discovered that a functioning Turkish branch existed, engaging in 
terrorist activities. 
A report by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) and the Security 
General Directorate of the Police in October 1991 mentions at least ten Islamic organizations that 
are active in Turkey: Turkish Islamic Liberation Army (IKO), Turkish Islamic Liberation Front 
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(TIK-C), Fighters of the Islamic Revolution (IDAM), Turkish Islamic Liberation Union (TIKB), 
World Sharia Liberation Army (DSKO), Universal Brotherhood Front-Sharia Revenge Squad 
(EKC-SIM), Islamic Liberation Party Front (IKP-C), Turkish Fighters of the Universal Islamic 
War of Liberation (EIK-TM), Turkish Islamic Fighters Army (IMO) and Turkish Sharia 
Revenge Commandos (TSIK). 
Purpose of the Study 
This study examine terrorism in Turkey in order to determine whether a relationship 
exists between sincerity of the members of various terrorist groups and the level of violence 
demonstrated in their activities. The sincerity of the members of terrorist groups is defined here 
as their willingness to stay within the organization for reasons other than economical and 
sociological considerations. This study attempts to analyze the membership process of terrorists 
by studying three different types of terrorist organizations, a leftist, a separatist and a religiously 
inspired.  All organizations analyzed  in this study are well known and have been recognized as 
terrorist organizations by the international bodies including the UN, the EU, and the US State 
Department.  
The first terrorist organization is the DHKP/C, a leftist terrorist organization in Turkey, 
which is at the same time one of the only two active leftist terrorist organizations in Europe.  The 
second is the PKK, an ethnic terrorist organization based in the eastern part of Turkey and 
Northern Iraq, and is also active in Europe. The last group of terrorist organizations are the 
radical Islamic groups namely Al-Qaeda, Hizb-urTahrir, and IBDA-CE which are active mostly 
all over Turkey. These organizations have members and activities all over Turkey and though 
they can be selective in terms of what they target and in terms of the modus operandi of their 
actions, they are all considered within the definition of law as terrorist organizations and their 
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actions as terrorism. 
In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (April 12
th
, 1991) terrorism is defined as follows: 
"Terror refers to all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for 
the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution, 
and the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial 
integrity of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the 
authority of the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of 
Turkish government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security” 
(TurkishGovernment, 1991). 
Counter Terrorism Department and Intelligence Department within Turkish National 
Police, distinguish three categories of terrorist groups: (1) Leftist Terrorist Organizations – most 
of these groups fall into Marxist-Leninist groups; (2) Separatist Groups – primarily PKK and its 
sub groups fall into this category; (3) Religiously Motivated Terrorist Groups – these groups 
include Turkish Hezbollah, IBDA-CE, Hizb-urTahrir, and Al-Qaeda. 
Theoretical Framework 
Terrorism is a crime. Like many other crimes, terrorism involves deviant behavior, which 
can be explained by various criminological theories. It is the author’s view that a single theory is 
not capable of providing an adequate explanation of terrorism. Terrorism is a multi dimensional 
phenomenon. Firstly, it is a social and cultural problem. Most terrorist conflicts arise from ethnic 
and heritage based conflicts. Secondly, regardless of ethnicity or social status, ideological 
dynamics play a role behind terrorism. Lastly, terrorism is simply as in the case of state 
terrorism. At the bottom line, terrorism involves an organized group of individuals acting 
towards a particular cause. Issues of ideological base, leadership, recruitment and retention of 
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members should be addressed in the research along with questions regarding commitment of 
criminal activities of these groups. In light of this view a number of criminological theories have 
been reviewed in the following paragraphs as they relate to the phenomenon of terrorism. 
Social Disorganization Theory explains the observed relationship between inequality and 
crime. This theory was first developed by Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay in 1942, striving to 
explain urban crime and deviance. The most significant finding of their study was that the rate of 
delinquency in the lower class neighborhoods was highest near the inner city and decreased as 
you moved toward the more affluent areas (Akers & Sellers, 2009; Messner & Golden, 1992). It 
has been concluded that communities lacking in social capital are less effective in applying 
social control to reduce violence as compared to communities with higher levels of social capital 
(Robert J.  Sampson, Raudenbush, & Earls, 2003). 
Social Disorganization Theory explains that low economic status; high levels of 
racial/ethnic heterogeneity and residential mobility affect the community’s level of social 
disorganization (Shaw & McKay, 2003). The areas in which Shaw & McKay (2003) found high 
delinquent rates are characterized by poor housing, physical decay, incomplete and broken 
families, high rates of illegitimate births, and an unstable population. Comparing low and high 
socioeconomic communities they found low socioeconomic status communities suffer from a 
weaker organizational base than higher status communities. Therefore these communities have 
less ability to engage in both social control and the appropriate socialization of their residents (R. 
J. Sampson & Groves, 1989).  
They suggest that social disorganization is the result of these characteristics which 
undermine informal social controls within the community and are directly related to high crime 
rates as opposed to urban ecology, depressed economic conditions, or rapid social changes 
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(Bursik, 1988). 
Anomie Strain Theory owes much to Emile Durkheim who first used the term “anomie” 
to refer to a lack of social regulation that promotes higher rates of suicide (Akers, 2000). By 
identifying inequality as a causal factor in crime, Merton (1938) made the first significant 
contribution to the inequality literature. His hypothesis states that “crime is a symptom of specific 
sort of social disorganization: the unequal distribution of means of success in society necessary 
to achieve “the American dream”. He explains that inequality of opportunity creates situations in 
which certain individuals engage in crime, in order to achieve culturally defined success. 
Anomie is the form that societal maladjustment takes when individuals seek levels of success 
that are not consistent with socially available means. In such conditions individuals may 
experience strain. This strain creates pressure as people attempt to succeed in an environment 
with limited opportunities. This lack of socially acceptable opportunities may push those 
individuals towards crime. Merton uses the concept of the American dream to help explain his 
theory. He states that the American dream promotes the idea that equal opportunity and therefore 
success is available to all. However, the reality is quite different as equal opportunity to achieve 
success is not available to all. For example, disadvantaged minority groups and the lower class 
do not have the same access to such legitimate opportunities (Akers, 2000).  
Merton (1938) identified five types of adaptation to strain. He described “Conformity” or 
an attempt to strive for success within the restricted conventional means available. He named the 
most common deviant response, “Innovation”. In this form of behavior one maintains a 
commitment to success goals but takes advantage of illegitimate means to attain them. A third 
response, “Rebellion” rejects the system altogether, both means and ends, and tries to replaces it 
with a new one. Finally, “Retreat” result when one gives up on both the success goals and the 
8 
 
effort to achieve them. In “Ritualism” one gives up the struggle to get ahead and concentrates 
only on retaining what little has been gained. This is accomplished in part by adhering strongly 
and zealously to the norms. This response is often produced by the disjuncture between society’s 
promise of equality and success and the actual inequalities in the distribution of opportunities. 
This inequality is most severe for members of the lower class, the disadvantaged, and minority 
groups. 
Following the school of strain and normlessness further studies have been made. For 
instance, the General Strain Theory (GST) is a modified version of earlier strain theories 
(Cloward & Ohlin, 2003; A. K. Cohen, 2003; Merton, 1938), which argue that criminal behavior 
results from the structurally-induced gap between aspirations and expectations. Encompassing 
and expanding the classical Mertonian view of strain and delinquency, GST focuses on negative 
relationships (e.g., poor academics, failed romantic relationships, financial crisis, interpersonal 
violence, job loss, etc.) from a social psychological view (Agnew, 1985; Agnew & White, 1992). 
While retaining the original concept of strain by Merton (1938), the revised theory posits three 
types of strain: the failure to achieve positively valued goals, the removal of positively valued 
goals, and the presentation of noxious stimuli.  
The addition of the new types of strain addresses some of the noteworthy weaknesses of 
Merton’s (1938) strain theory, which include “criminal and delinquent behaviors that are 
spontaneous, violent and emotionally-charged, and of which social structure is not a foundational 
factor” (Vegh, 2011, p. 17). Agnew’s perception of strain (1985, 1987, 2006) allows for a wider 
application of the theory on criminal and delinquent acts, such as substance use, traffic 
violations, juvenile crime, and violence related crimes (i.e. terrorism). 
Marxist Theory tends to refer more to the control by the system than to the behavior 
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(Akers, 2000, p. 195). The first systematic application of Marxism to the crime discourse was 
introduced by Dutch criminologist Willem Bonger (1887-1940) who hypothesized that crime is 
produced by the “capitalist organization of society”(Bonger, 1916). Marxist theory hypothesizes 
that both the number and types of crime in a society are produced by the fundamental conditions 
of capitalism. With the maximization of profit as its central goal, capitalism promotes 
competition and individualism to the detriment of cooperation and is harmful to the community 
(Bohm, 1985; Messner & Rosenfeld, 2003). According to Bohm (1985), self-interest and 
competition are not limited to the working classes but can influence all members of a capitalist 
society and thus set up conditions conducive to criminal behavior among all classes. 
According to Marxist theory, capitalism has a ruling class that dominates the proletariat. 
The latter has the majority of members but nothing to sell except their labor. But the ruling class, 
on the other hand, has the political power because the capitalists’ monopoly gives them that 
power. This power allows them to manipulate the legal and the criminal justice system to 
promote their interests and to maintain power. The masses of workers have no power to help 
establish their domination. Their only choice is to bring down the government and destroy the 
capitalist economy (Akers, 2000). 
The introduction of rational choice theory to the study of terrorism has had enormous 
consequences. Among other things, it has ended with the sort of “methodological 
exceptionalism” that was endemic in the field. Terrorism can be studied like any other social 
phenomenon. The strategic interaction between TOs and the state cries out for game theory 
modeling. Likewise, the relationship between the terrorist organization and its supporters, the 
choice of terrorist tactics (including suicide missions) or the constraints that affect TOs are issues 
that can be analyzed with rational choice instruments. Rational choice theory has also been used 
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to propose counterterrorist policy recommendations (Frey & Luechinger, 2002).  
Rational choice theory holds that people will engage in crime after weighing the costs 
and benefits of their actions to arrive at a rational choice about motivation after perceiving that 
the chances of gain outweigh any possible punishment or loss.  Criminals must come to believe 
their actions will be beneficial to themselves, their community, or society, and they must come to 
see that crime pays, or is at least a risk-free way to better their situation(Hagan, 2011).  Perhaps 
the most well-known version of this idea in criminology is routine activities theory (L. E. Cohen 
& Felson, 1979), which postulates that three conditions must be present in order for a crime to 
occur: (1) suitable targets or victims who put themselves at risk; (2) the absence of capable 
guardians or police presence; and (3) motivated offenders or a pool of the unemployed and 
alienated.  Other rational choice theories exist which delve further into models of decision 
making.  In the few models of collective violence that have found their way into criminology, 
the Olson (1971)hypothesis suggests that participants in revolutionary violence predicate their 
behavior on a rational cost-benefit calculus to pursue the best course of action given the social 
circumstances. 
     Rational choice theory, in political science, follows a similar line, and holds that people 
can be collectively rational, even when making what appears to be irrational decisions for them 
as individuals, after perceiving that their participation is important and their personal 
contribution to the public good outweighs any concerns they may have for the "free rider" 
problem (Muller & Opp, 1986).  
     Terrorism is not a pathological phenomenon.  The resort to terrorism is not an 
aberration.  The central focus of study ought to be on why some groups find terrorism useful, and 
in standard control theory fashion, why other groups do not find terrorism useful.  Some groups 
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may continue to work with established patterns of dissident action.  Other groups may resort to 
terrorism because they have tried other alternatives. Still other groups may choose terrorism as 
an early choice because they have learned from the experiences of others, usually through the 
news media. Crenshaw (1998) calls this the contagion effect, and claims it has distinctive 
patterns similar to the copycat effect as in other theories of collective violence (Gurr, 
1970).  There may be circumstances in which a terrorist group wants to publicize its cause to the 
world – a process Crenshaw (1995) calls the globalization of civil war. 
     Factors that influence the rational choice of terrorism include place, size, time, and the 
climate of international opinion.  A terrorist plot in a democratic society is less likely to involve 
senseless violence than a scheme hatched under an authoritarian regime because under the latter, 
terrorists realize they have nothing to lose with the expected repercussions.  Size is important 
because a small elite group is more likely to resort to terrorism when the population is 
passive.  This means that more senseless acts of violence may occur in a stable society rather 
than in one on the verge of collapse.  Time constraints are important because the terrorist group 
may be competing with other groups or attempting to manage a tit-for-tat strategy with 
counterterrorism.  The climate of international opinion, if low for the problems of the host 
country, may force terrorists to take action that risks a repressive counterterrorist reaction, in 
hopes that their suffering will capture public attention.  In short, terrorism is an excellent tool for 
managing the political agenda on a world stage. 
The study of terrorism through the perspective of rational choice theory is still in its early 
stages. In recent years, a number of talented modelers have started to apply the analytical 
instruments of rational choice theory to explain terrorism. Along with that, it is reasonable to 
expect many other similar contributions in near future. The field is now under deep 
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transformation. Probably the definitive implosion will take place when formal models become 
integrated with empirical, comparative research.  
This study will integrate different criminological theories in explaining the research 
question. Different theories explain different aspects of criminal behavior.  
Research Question 
The researcher uses secondary data analysis; data for sincerity level, violence level, and 
demographic and economic variable. The data have been derived from the testimonial statements 
of terrorist group members at Turkish National Police’s database. 
Does the sincerity / fidelity of the terrorists have any impact on committing terrorist 
activities?  
Following the main research question, this study also explores whether socio-economic 
status has any impact on recruitment and level of activities engaged in by the terrorists. And the 
question of whether ethnic and religious affiliation matter in level of violence exerted by 
terrorists is also explored. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
Introduction 
In an emergent study, data collection stage starts as soon as you have a research 
situation.  You can then access literature as it becomes relevant. Glaser (1978) makes much of 
the prior background reading which provides the models to help make sense of the data.  He 
recommends reading widely while avoiding the literature most closely related to what you are 
researching, because your reading may otherwise constrain your coding and memoing.  
Following this suggestion, an extensive review of literature on terrorism has been done 
by the researcher. However, the terrorist groups and their ideas within the specific country 
described in this study are not well known in the literature. For that reason, each group and 
current situation of that specific group is explained in general.  
Defining Terrorism 
While one person can describe someone or a group as a terrorist, the other can describe 
them as freedom fighters (Ganor, 2002; Larabee, 2011; Saul, 2005; Sorel, 2003; Tripathy, 2010). 
This dilemma helps explain why terrorism does not have a single definition. This is a major 
problem in defining terrorism, and effects in the ongoing study and development of policies 
needed to respond to terrorism. Terrorism is a widespread problem, which threatens the modern 
world. It is a disease that attacks regardless of nation, religion, language, race and sect and kills 
innocent people in a way that cannot be justified by any religious, political, or ideological 
doctrine. Today no nation in our modern world can consider it self-safe against terrorism. 
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International and national terrorism have gained their places in the world literature as the most 
basic and up-to-date concepts of the post-Cold War period. Unfortunately, terrorism is not only 
threatening the lives and safety of citizens in countries where it spreads violence, but it also 
causes serious harm to the economy and politics of the related countries. Moreover, it may also 
create conflicts between the public and the state because of the security measures taken to 
combat terrorism.  
The word “terror” has a Latin origin, and it was first used in its current form during the 
French Revolution. The term “terror” that we use today is derived from the Latin word “terrere” 
which refers to be filled with fear, to tremble with fear (Kaplan, 2011). The word “terrere” is 
derived from “tre”, which means to tremble in Latin. The word “terrorism” was first used in 
1795, just after the French Revolution with the meaning “intimidation by state by means of 
creating fear,” and it was used as “terrrorisme” in France. The concept of terrorism was 
introduced to the world literature by the British in 1798 and was regarded as “the systematic use 
of terror.” The term “terrorist” in its modern meaning was first used in 1947 referring to the 
tactics used by the Jews against the British on Palestinian territory. In addition, the word 
“terrorist” was used for the Revolutionists in Russia in 1866 and for the radicals and reformists, 
who were called the “Jacobins,” during the French Revolution in 1790s (Reitan, 2010).              
The problem of defining terrorism is the main element in the fight against terrorism both 
in international and national terms. Although there have been various definitions of terrorism, the 
most frequently used definition contains two basic elements: use of violence and the desire to 
change the political system. Politicians, academicians, security experts, journalists and 
government representatives use various kinds of definitions in order to identify terrorism. While 
the definition of terrorism set forth by the governments is different from that of the scholars, it 
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may also differ between different state institutions. For instance, the United States has been very 
cautious while defining terrorism so as not to include the IRA organization. The USA did not 
include the IRA for many years in the list of terrorist groups throughout the world, which is 
declared every year. The underlying reason for this is thought to be that there are around 50 
million US citizens with Irish nationality living in the country. Only lately, the IRA was included 
in the list of terrorist groups declared by the United States in the year 2000. However, the USA 
felt the necessity of making an explanation and stated the name of the organization as “the real 
IRA”.  As this example illustrates, it seems difficult to attain a general definition of terrorism as 
of today. However, it depends on us to regard this difficulty as richness and to take advantage of 
this variety of definitions. In most basic terms, terrorism is the use of force with violence and 
threats in order to change the political system. Terrorism is a threat, a method of fighting or a 
strategy to achieve a particular target that absolutely includes use of “violence”. It aims at 
creating fear in the public by means of merciless and inhuman methods.  
If we have a look at the definitions throughout the world, despite the fact that we face 
various and very different definitions, there are many common points. For instance, in the 
Encyclopedia Britannica, terrorism is explained as “terror, resorting to systematic violence acts 
against public or individuals with the aim to achieve a political target” (Terrorism, 2004).  
In the Turkish Anti-Terrorism Act (April 12
th
, 1991) terrorism is defined as follows: 
"Terror is all kinds of activities attempted by a member or members of an organization for the 
purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which is stated in the constitution, and 
the political, jurisdictional, social, secular, economic system, destroying the territorial integrity 
of the state and the government and its people, weakening or ruining or invading the authority of 
the government, demolishing the rights and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish 
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government and Republic, destroying the public order or peace and security” ( Law of Terror 
Prevention,1991,p,1). 
The definition of the U.N is that "‘Terrorism’ means any act of violence or threat thereof 
notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective 
criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their 
lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or 
private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or 
international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or 
sovereignty of independent States” (Freezing Funds, 2003). 
In the British Anti-Terrorism Act (Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989) it is stated, "terrorism is 
the use of violence for political ends (including) any use of violence for the purpose of putting 
the public, or any section of the public in fear"(Prevention of Terrorism, 1989). On the other 
hand, France defines terrorism as “an act by an individual or group that uses intimidation or 
terror to disrupt public order" (How five foreign countries, 2000). Moreover, “In Germany, 
terrorism has been described as an enduringly conducted struggle for political goals, which are 
intended to be achieved by means of assaults on the life and property of other persons, especially 
by means of severe crimes” (Martin, 2002). 
The FBI’s definition of terrorism is “the unlawful use of force or violence against 
persons, or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (Terrorism in the United States, 
1997).  In addition, according to the definition formulated by the US, “ terrorism is any violence 
perpetrated for political reasons by sub national groups or secret state agents, often directed at 
noncombatant targets, and usually intended to influence an audience” (Terrorism and America, 
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1998).  
Different governments have different definitions. Likewise, different federal institutions 
have their own definitions of terror. For instance, the definition used by the FBI is different from 
that of the U.S. State Department. According to the definition of the FBI, individuals, as well as 
groups, have the possibility to carry out terrorist actions. In addition to political aims, the FBI 
includes social aims as well.  However, the U.S State Department’s definition comes from its 
own field.  
 As it can be understood from all these definitions, the element of “violence” has a 
dominant role. Violence is the most common characteristic in all the definitions stated above. 
Just as we have listed the definitions here, Alex P. Schmid has made a study of about 120 
different definitions of terror in his book titled Political Violence. He has tried to figure out the 
common points in the definitions and reach a general assessment. According to the results of this 
research, violence and use of force have been the most common element appearing in about 90% 
of the 120 definitions. Therefore, violence and the use of force turn out to be the element 
accepted in most general terms. After violence, ideological or political aim appears in 65%, and 
concepts such as fear, threat, or psychological impact are third following the ideological or 
political aim. As a result, from all these studies and generally accepted definitions, it can be 
concluded that in general terms terror is: “all kinds of actions performed by a group and include 
violence and ideological/political aim” (Schmid, 1988). In light of the professional experience of 
the author, terrorism can also be defined as “all kinds of actions, not necessarily destructive or 
violent and even when within the limits of law, that are performed with the motives of 
ideological and or political gains via intimidation and organized activity”. 
Today, one of the most important bases of democratic societies is the non-governmental 
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organization. By means of these non-governmental structures, not only does the public find the 
opportunity to express itself, but also people can transmit their wishes to the political authorities, 
hence ensuring development of democracy. Non-governmental organizations carry out their 
activities to attain their demands only within a legal framework, and they never resort to 
violence. This is the clearest particularity that differentiates between non-governmental 
organizations and terrorist organizations. Although there are some similarities between terrorist 
organizations and non-governmental organizations in terms of structure and aim, the most 
significant characteristic of terrorist organizations is the fact that they take violence as the basis 
in achieving their goals.  
In conclusion, although there are more than a hundred of different definitions of terrorism 
throughout the world made by states, international institutions, or scientists, and although each 
one of these definitions seems to be different, there are two main elements in nearly all of the 
said definitions: violence and use of force. 
Violence and Use of Force 
The goal of achieving an ideological change in the order is a result of this violence and 
use of force.  
Therefore, violence and use of force has taken its place in the world of terror literature as 
the most significant element. As a result, today, it cannot be right to regard actions which do not 
include violence as terror; moreover, countries declaring an organization as a terrorist 
organization in the international arena must be certain that this organization uses violence and 
force. If not, it is not a terrorist organization. 
In addition, the definition of terrorist differs among the governments. For example, the 
U.S. government considers all terrorists as criminals, whatever their ethnic, religious, or other 
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affiliations are. (Terrorism in the United States, 1997). On the other hand, The Turkish Law of 
Terror Prevention (12.04.1991) first defines the terrorism as following: 
"Terrorism is all kinds of activities to be attempted by a member or members of an 
organization for the purpose of changing the characteristics of the Republic which are 
stated in the constitution, and the political, legal, social, secular, economic system, 
destroying the territorial integrity of the state and the government and its people, 
weakening or ruining or invading the authority of the government, demolishing the rights 
and freedom, jeopardizing the existence of Turkish government and Republic, destroying 
the public order or peace and security (Official Gazzette, 1991)."  
In the second article of the Law, referring to the first article, terrorist is defined as being a 
member of an organization which is aiming to realize the goals referred in the first article and to 
commit crimes for those ends (Official Gazzette, 1991). In short, a terrorist could be defined as a 
person who is a member of a terrorist organization and commits crime for the goals of that 
organization.  
Characteristics of Terrorism 
An unclear problem makes the solutions addressing that problem insufficient. In this 
regard, general characteristics of terrorism will be examined to better acknowledge the facts of 
terrorism. These characteristics are rather general and examples are provided from real life 
terrorist organizations or independence movements where appropriate.  
Violence 
 
Terrorists apply extreme random violence including brutal and cruel methods of violent 
activities, such as mass bombings and mass killings against the innocent. Their tactics mostly 
involve violent activities such as assassination, explosions, kidnapping, hijacking, suicide 
bombers, ambushes, and raids. Terrorists are also usually successful in their attacks as the targets 
are unaware of their plans. Terrorist violence is generally well-planned and organized through a 
chain of command.  
Individual violent activities would not qualify as terrorism. In this regard, Hoffman 
Comment [JDR1]: You need to flesh these 
sections out a little more. One half page is not 
enough given that you are trying to define terrorism 
in very specific terms 
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(1998) states that an incident to qualify as terrorism must involve violence and must be 
perpetrated by an organization which has conspiratorial political goals and an existing chain of 
command beyond a single individual act on somebody’s own (Hoffmann, 1998). 
Political and Ideological Agendas 
 
Many agree that terrorism uses violence as a strategy to achieve certain goals. Those who 
oppose existing governments can use violence, or people who want to maintain existing power 
can use it. Terrorism is a means of insurrection that can be used by people of different political 
convictions to gain political goals (Reitan, 2010). 
Attaining a political goal is a significant and consistent concept used for defining 
terrorism. These political goals set terrorist acts apart from criminal acts. Politically motivated 
terrorism involves a deeply held sense of grievance over some form of social or economic 
injustice. Modern terrorist organizations justify their actions not only with stated political aims 
but also by appeals to some higher universal truth and the demand for political transformation 
(Kassimeris, 2008). 
Terrorism always has a political agenda. This agenda may be motivated by various 
ideologies like Marxism, ethnical motivations or radical religious ideas. Terrorist organizations 
manage to survive because of the ideological motivations and support they have. Terrorist 
organizations break generally accepted norms or codes of behaviors of the society in pursuit of 
their political gains. Hoffman (1998), in his book Inside Terrorism, describes terrorism as 
fundamentally and inherently “political.” He argues that terrorism is “ineluctably about power: 
the pursuit of power, the acquisition of power, and the use of power to achieve political change. 
Terrorism is thus violence – or, equally important, the threat of violence – used and directed in 
pursuit of, or in service of, a political aim” (p.2). 
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If the terrorist organizations did not represent any ideology, their violence would be on 
the level of organized crime, and their main purpose would be monetary gain. If the terrorist 
organizations did not fight for the sake of a political aim, it would be impossible for those 
organizations to find members and to get support from their followers. However, all of the 
terrorist organizations have their own ideologies, and they seek support from the believers by 
saying that they are fighting for the benefit of their ideology. 
Also, the lack of opportunity for political participation regardless of the ideology would 
eventually create motivation for terrorism. Regimes that deny access to political participation 
create dissatisfaction and frustration in the denied group by forming discrimination. This 
discrimination might eventually become a terrorist movement if the authorities keep denying 
access to political participation (Whittaker, 2003). 
Effects of Terrorist Violence 
 
Extremists always thrive on insatiability. In such revolutionary situations, the terrorists 
usually win (Frey & Luechinger, 2002). Psychological, economical, diplomatic, strategic and 
political consequences of the violence are more prominent than the attacks and incidents the 
terrorists are carrying out (Crenshaw, 1998, 1995). Short term effects of terrorism would involve 
an immediate psychological effect on the society including fear and vulnerability, whereas the 
long term effects would involve many potential political, ecological and/or economical 
outcomes. In fact, the consequences of terrorism tend to have a higher rank in the scale of the 
values (Chomsky & Achcar, 2002). The far-reaching effects of terrorism are quite clear from the 
recent September 11
th
 attacks. The cost of the September 11th attacks exceeds one hundred 
billion dollars in the short term and in the long term the price tag is estimated around two trillion 
dollars (IAGS, 2004). Certainly, the direct effect of the terrorism is on the immediate victims 
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who got killed or wounded because of the terrorist activity (whether the victim was the direct 
target or happened to be a bystander). Then the close family circles of the victims suffer from the 
very immediate consequences of terror by losing their loved ones or by seeing the victims 
wounded.  
This circle expands as the events are brought to the public attention by the media. As the 
terrorist events carry on, everybody in the society begins to feel the effect of terrorism. People 
begin to worry about their own life and suffer psychologically because of terror. 
Terrorism also affects the economy for a variety of reasons: business interruptions 
because of the attacks, the loss of trust to the stability of international business which in turn 
causes a loss or decline of, and loss of tourism revenue as people are usually reluctant to spend 
their vacations where there are some serious concerns. An example of this would be the United 
States travel warnings for travelers to Turkey. After two synagogue bombings in Istanbul at the 
end of 2003, the U.S. State Department issued a travel advisory and asked its citizens not to 
travel to Turkey which was reversed on March 22
nd
 2004.  
Another example of economic effect comes from the U.S. following the September 11th 
attacks, American Transportation Policy by R. Dilger (2002) writes "... the possibility of an 
economic panic, the American stock exchange ceased trading on September 11, 2001, as news of 
the terrorists' attacks spread across the globe" (pg. 112). Furthermore, many stock exchange 
markets around the world watched the aftermaths of the September 11 in panic. Politicians and 
bureaucrats also start to worry about the security and focus on the fight against terrorism instead 
of their daily routine. Terrorism and security become the primary issue in the country and may 
be replacing the welfare and health issues of the citizens. This list could be expanded. It is 
essential to understand that the terrorist activities are usually used to reach long term goals and 
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strategies. 
Atmosphere of Chaos and Fear 
 
Terrorists try to spread and form an atmosphere of chaos, fear, and panic in the targeted 
population. With the help of publicity from their actions, terrorists try to reach people they are 
targeting to make them feel and believe that they are living in constant danger. In this regard, in 
most of the definitions and regulations, the words “fear”, “chaos” and “panic” are used to 
describe this situation. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense uses fear in its description 
of terrorism: “use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear” (Martin, 2003, p. 33). 
Similarly, Hall and Clark while studying the definition of terrorism and the U.S. codes in his 
book Companion to American Law, state that terrorism is "... the political goals of terrorists 
often are ... create wide- spread panic and chaos. The increased concern ...” (2002, p. 102). 
Accordingly, most terrorist organizations try to kill as many of their targets as possible to 
escalate the panic and chaos. For example, the Mau-Mau movement in Kenya terrorized the 
British who were the colonial invading power in Kenya during the 1950s. They spread such 
violence that both the British people living in Kenya were not able to go out because they were 
in such fear; additionally, even the British in London thousand of miles away from Kenya were 
also afraid (Gilbert, 2011). This movement eventually allowed the native Kenyans to gain 
autonomy. This example illustrates the far-reaching effects of terror. These psychological effects 
on the society evoke a sense of horror, fear, vulnerability and indignity (Armborst, 2010) and 
people begin to believe that anyone at anytime can be a victim of terrorism. 
Conflict between the Society and the Governments 
Terrorists want to create conflict between the society and the governments. The terrorists 
desire that the fear and panic they are spreading will eventually galvanize the governments to go 
24 
 
after them very harshly which is considered to lead a conflict in the society between the 
government forces and the people. Eventually, this conflict is considered to be used for terrorists’ 
own grounds to overthrow the governments or to have the governments to counter their own 
population for security reasons. 
As a matter of fact, many philosophers argued that conflict is the only means for change 
in society. For example, Marxist ideology argues that a political change cannot be achieved 
without a conflict (Marx, 1887). Marx always argued that the workers and other people in the 
society, in order to get what they want, have to confront the government and the owners of the 
businesses to reach their demands. 
Similarly, the Anti-Colonist philosopher Frantz Fanon argued that nobody would give up 
power willingly; therefore, the power had to be taken violently (Fanon, 1967). In this regard, 
terrorists always seek ways to force the governments they are terrorizing to go after them. The 
terrorists are looking for a fight because they want the current government to change or fail. The 
government typically responds with strict measures against their populations ranging from 
conducting body searches on the streets to moving people to camps as prisoners1 or torturing the 
suspects. 
According to Marx this kind of conflict is believed to alienate the society from their 
governments and have them to support the terrorist organizations in the long run to overthrow 
the governments or to acquire their demands. Latin American terrorism, like in Uruguay, 
constitutes a very good example for this pattern where most of the time the governments applied 
state terrorism in the name of fighting terrorism like Uruguay. When the Tupomaro movement 
began to spread its terror in Uruguay, the Uruguayan government began to terrorize its own 
citizens while looking for the suspects. The tactics of the Uruguayan government involved 
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torture, rape, beatings and murder, and those tactics were openly accepted by the officials. The 
officers saw themselves as doing their official job while they were torturing or killing people 
through their investigations to find the suspects. Being frightened from the terror of the state, the 
people of Uruguay began to support the Tupamaros which led the Tupomaros to run for office as 
they believed they could get the majority of the votes. However, they lost the elections and the 
newly elected right-wing government used similar tactics to fight against the Tupomaros 
involving many human right violations (Douglas, 2010). 
Another good example of this pattern would be the Algerian independence movement 
after the First World War, which ended the French occupation in Algeria in 1962. The Algerians 
who wanted the French out of their country began to get organized under the leadership FLN 
(Front de Libération Nationale, National Liberation Front). Their main goal was to get their 
country back and to regain control of their countries’ resources from the occupying French 
power (or they said, from the “whites”). They also wanted to get “those whites” from their 
country (Art & Richardson, 2007). As they began to terrorize the French and those Algerians 
who were collaborating with the French very closely, the French government took very strict 
measures to stop this movement. They emptied and burned villages, tried to arrest all of the men 
that were not working for them even if they had nothing to do with the FLN, imprisoned families 
in the camps on very high mountains, and even tortured and killed the suspects. However, none 
of those responses stopped the FLN members. In the conflict between the French and the 
Algerians, the French lost 15,000 soldiers, and over 1.5 million Algerian civilians were killed 
according to Algerians. However, French claimed there were 350,000 causalities (LOC, Algeria- 
a Country Study). At the end, the French had to leave Algeria, and the Algerians became 
independent in 1962 (Martin, 2008). 
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Secrecy 
Terrorist organizations are clandestine by nature, and they usually try to apply the highest 
secrecy standards inside the organization. They generally tend to be internally conservative and 
closed groups because they want to preserve themselves from the government powers 
(Crenshaw, 1995). 
In order to maintain secrecy, the terrorists: 
• Try to maintain a normal life style when looked from outside, 
• Use fake IDs, 
• Form terrorist cells, 
• Cut their relations with their close circles like family members, relatives and close 
friends (this may differ in ethnic terrorism), 
• Have strict rules on secrecy, 
• Try not to use any traceable communication techniques, 
• Do not talk about their backgrounds to their companions to avoid being identified, 
• If they do not stay in cells, they might prefer to stay with the sympathizers because of 
security concerns because they believe that they will not survive if they are caught in 
their cells. 
Terrorists survive by blending into society. They always obey their internal security rules 
to avoid revealing their locations, which is why they apply extreme caution while carrying out 
their activities (Crenshaw, 1998). Their actions are generally well-planned. Planning and 
approval of this plan are an intrinsic process that must be followed unless otherwise ordered by 
leaders of the organizations. Terrorists want to make sure that everything during their activities 
goes right without any problems; that's why they work on every detail before their attacks 
including their route and tactics after their actions. 
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Publicity of the terrorist activities has priority among the results of the terrorist incidents. 
Terrorist tactics usually attract worldwide publicity very quickly because their violence is 
designed to generate attention and publicity. As a matter of fact, publicity is a must for the 
terrorists in order for them to survive and recruit new members. Terrorists seek ways to be on the 
media to maintain publicity which helps them to gain recognition, present themselves as a group 
that should not be ignored and that must be taken account of, recruit more people and 
propagandize easier (Grunwald, 2001). 
In fact, propaganda is impossible without the use of media, and it has been said that the 
media is terrorist’s best friend as they are determined to give terrorist events maximum exposure 
(Laqueur, 1999). They know the importance of the media, and they try to use media for their 
own causes. This publicity, mostly due to the unpredicted and dramatic violent attacks of 
terrorism, keeps terrorism in the forefront of the public eye and the government’s concern.  
Also, the horrifying publicized face of terrorism forms an atmosphere of panic and fear 
which could cause some officers and people to exaggerate the strength and importance of the 
terrorist organization. There are many examples of the way publicity is manipulated a result of 
terrorist events. Jenkins (2011) compares the insurgents who fought in Angola, Mozambique and 
Portuguese Guinea to the Palestinians. The former groups used the standard tactics of guerilla 
warfare for years and were hardly noticed by the world. However, when Palestinian terrorists 
terrorized the Munich Olympics in 1972, they managed to gain publicity immediately, and they 
sparked world-wide concern by generating global awareness (Ward, 2003). 
In terms of causality, terrorism has a low occurrence, but when it occurs, its effects are 
far-reaching (Sandler, 2011). Terrorist related casualties have a much lower probability when 
compared with the other causes of deaths; however, due to the nature of terrorism, it is highly 
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publicized. As the statistics are studied, it is obvious that the causalities that are the results of 
terrorist activities are far less than the other types of reasons of causalities such as traffic 
accidents. 
For example, 6,694 people died because of terrorist-related incidents in 1998 in the 
world, whereas, only in the United States, almost 17,000 people were murdered. Traffic 
accidents took the lives of 41,504 people and over 7,000 people died from of infections. Similar 
results come from Turkish statistics. For example, in 2001, almost 3,000 people died because of 
traffic accidents while only 53 people (including the law enforcement those died in the conflicts) 
died because of terrorism (TUIK, 2011). 
When this rate is applied to the world’s population, the probability increases 
significantly. As it is obviously seen from the statistics, there are many more causes of death 
which rank considerably higher than terrorism. However, the causalities that are as a result of 
terrorist activities attract more attention mostly due to publicity. Therefore, terrorism has low 
probability but high consequences in terms of causality. 
Unexpected Nature of Terrorism 
Terrorism is unpredicted or unexpected cruelty. Terrorists get to choose their weapons, 
place, and time of the attacks. Terrorists strike at unexpected times as most of the time the targets 
are incapable of defending themselves. Choosing the location and time of their attacks leads 
them to success in most of their attacks. Some scholars even used the word “unexpected” as one 
of the major elements of their definition of terrorism as Gurr calls terrorism: “the use of 
unexpected violence to intimidate or coerce people in the pursuit of political or social 
objectives” (Gurr, 1970, p. 32). 
Terrorists do not obey or recognize the rules of war and they are not concerned about any 
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ethics. They have their own set of rules and announced enemies or targets. On the other hand, 
there are clear rules for wars, and the innocent are supposed to be protected in the wars. 
However, terrorists reverse the rules of wars or any ethical concerns by killing innocent people. 
They put bombs in the places where there are many civilian causalities including children, 
elderly and woman in order to kill as many as possible of them. Terrorists disregard the rules of 
war and their mass killings are the motivation partial accomplishments of today’s terrorism, 
which cannot be achieved by conventional war (Ross, 2006). 
Terrorists also don’t wear uniforms and they blend in the society. It is impossible to 
distinguish them form everyday people. Anybody could be a terrorist, and it is nearly impossible 
to detect a private citizen who can hide explosions on his or her body easily. 
Most of the terrorist movements fail to reach their long-term strategic goals and they 
rarely achieve what they are after in the long run. In fact, government powers generally 
overpower them and eventually the terrorists loose their power (Palmer & Palmer, 2008). 
However, in the short run, terrorists can be successful due to the nature and characteristics of 
their activities (Williamson, 2009). They can attract opponents of the current government, 
political opponents, they can recruit many members, they can spread a massive violence, or they 
can generate publicity and supporters. 
For example, during their early establishments in Uruguay, the Tupomaros managed to be 
seen or considered as an alternative power of the government with very few members (Schelling, 
1960). Being very sure of their success and support, they decided to run for office. However, 
their success came to an end when they began to kill the innocent people. Especially the killings 
of the innocent turned over people from them and they lost the elections. Furthermore, if the 
appropriate long term social precautions are not taken, the terrorists could win the long term by 
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winning the hearts of the society (Smith, 2008). 
Terrorism is usually the weapon of the weak that lacks the conventional powers of 
military. The only exception to this is state terrorism (Douglas, 2010). The weaker party that 
cannot fight conventionally tries to gain advantage by using terrorism. Terrorism has been a low-
cost high-influence method. Terrorism may enable small groups, nations, sub-national groups 
and even individuals to get around the requirements of national strength including political, 
economic, or conventional military power (Amos II & Stolfi, 1982). 
Terrorism may not achieve a political objective in the long run, but it certainly gives the 
feeling of revenge and it also attracts the media and the world for the causes of the terrorists. As 
long as the issues behind the terrorism continue to exist, frustration and peer pressure will lead to 
other attempts of terrorism (Armborst, 2010). A terrorist in Palestine stated the following in an 
interview: "Give me tanks and airplanes, and I shall stop sending suicide bombers into Israel" 
(Faria, G, & M, 2005). The terrorists clearly try to justify themselves by arguing that they do not 
have the conventional means of war and required infrastructure to carry out a war. 
On the other hand, fighting against terrorism is difficult for the states because most of the 
time they do not know where their enemy is or when and where the terrorists will strike. 
Furthermore, the cell structure that is used by most terrorist organizations helps to maintain the 
group’s security and near immunity from the law enforcement, which makes the fight against 
terror more difficult. 
A very good example for how terrorism becomes the weapon of the weak comes from 
history. A group named Assassins or Hashishins terrorized the Anatolia region, today where 
Turkey, Iran and Iraq intersects, for about 200 years. An Ishmaelite leader named Hassan bin 
Sabbah, formed a terrorist organization that managed to survive between 1090 and 1275. Sabbah 
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would recruit the young Ishmaelite ’s who were called fedains by using his fake heaven where he 
served hashish to them by the hands of beautiful and young women which made those 
youngsters addicted to this place. Sabbah preyed on the young men’s weakness and was able to 
control them. For the sake of the hashish and the women, those fedains would do anything 
Sabbah asked. 
Fedains were very few in numbers; however, they managed to spread their terror so 
extensively that people were afraid of to go out in the public since they were afraid of being 
stabbed with the fedains’ poisoned daggers (Grunwald, 2001). 
Workers' Party of Kurdistan PKK 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) is a leftist Kurdish nationalist organization. It was 
founded in 1974 by a group of Turkish students of ethnic Kurdish descent who were active in 
communist circles within Turkey. PKK was operated informally until 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan. 
Influenced heavily by Maoist doctrine, the PKK's goal was to incite a revolution that would free 
the Kurdish people and establish an independent Kurdish state. When it was founded, the group 
was violently opposed to the Turkish government, believing that a Kurdish state could only be 
established if the oppressive and colonialist Turkish government was defeated (MIPT Database, 
2006). The PKK is one of the bloodiest terrorist organizations in history. The PKK seeks to 
establish an independent Marxist state in southeastern Turkey. It was formally formed in 1978 in 
the capital city of Turkey, Ankara. It soon launched a violent campaign against people who 
openly support the government and its policies and Kurdish tribes that had historically been 
living peacefully with the Turkish government (Saladino, 2008).  
By 1980, Turkey's internal security situation had gotten noticeably worse because of 
randomly applied PKK terrorism. By the early 1980s, the group had ruthlessly murdered about 
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250 people. Since 1984, random violence and the terrorist activities hold by the PKK have 
claimed thousands of lives. Women, children and the old are not excluded from their attacks. 
People have been murdered in front of their family members or kidnapped and executed 
ruthlessly. Furthermore, the PKK has maintained a position as a sub-contractor of the 
international terror and drug dealer networks. It preserved interactions with some Middle 
Eastern, African, European, and Latin American terrorist groups as well as many drug 
traffickers. Today, the PKK still tries to maintain its activities in Turkey; however, its terror has 
dramatically declined after the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who was arrested in Kenya 
and extradited to Turkey where he faced the death penalty on terrorism charges. However 
Turkey abolished the death penalty in 2002 and his sentence was changed to life imprisonment. 
The arrest of Ocalan seriously weakened the PKK. Following his arrest, Ocalan declared a 
unilateral cease-fire and announced his desire to establish a "peace initiative" with Turkey on 
Kurdish issues. The PKK affirmed Ocalan's wishes, purportedly disavowing its violent history. 
Currently, the PKK struggles to maintain its activities especially in Northern Iraq, Syria, and 
throughout Europe. 
Turkish Hezbollah 
Turkish Hezbollah was founded in southeastern Turkey during the early 1980's. Its goal 
was the establishment of a Sunni Muslim theocracy in Turkey, which they attempted to achieve 
by overthrowing Turkey's secular regime. Despite the common name, Turkish Hezbollah is 
unrelated to the Iranian-sponsored Lebanese Hezbollah. It is suspected that Turkish Hezbollah 
has also received Iranian funding and support, as Iran sought to spread its revolutionary Islamic 
ideology into Turkey. Turkish Hezbollah focused the bulk of its attacks on the PKK, which it 
accused of anti-Muslim activities. The group also focused on spreading its Islamic theology 
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through Turkey through bookstores and publishing houses. Because the Turkish government's 
main counterterrorism efforts at this time were directed against the PKK, some accuse the 
government of supporting and funding Turkish Hezbollah as a proxy, a charge they deny. 
Regardless of official government complicity, their focus on combating PKK allowed Turkish 
Hezbollah to act without fear of government reprisal. Charges of connections to the Turkish 
government are furthered by the fact that from its founding until 2000, Turkish Hezbollah was 
not involved in any violent confrontation with Turkish police or security forces (Arinç, 2010). 
The group’s situation greatly changed in the mid 1990’s, as PKK’s threat to Turkey 
waned, culminating in a 1999 truce. It became a target for the Turkish government when the 
group began to target secular academics and journalists, feminists and religious Muslims who did 
not support its goal of establishing an Islamic state in Turkey. Full-scale operations against the 
group by the Turkish government began in 2000, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of militants 
throughout southeastern Turkey. Turkish police, investigating the fraudulent use of a kidnapped 
businessperson’s credit card, were led to small house in the city of Beykoz, where a shootout 
ensued and the group’s leader, HuseyinVelioglu, was killed. Many of its remaining members 
have escaped to Iran and Iraq (Arinç, 2010).  
Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front DHKP/C 
DHKP/C is a Turkish leftist terrorist organization originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci 
Sol or Dev- Sol, which is a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front 
(THKP/C). After factional infighting, it was renamed in 1994 as the Revolutionary People's 
Liberation Party/Front DHKP/C. The group espouses a strong Marxist ideology is extremely 
anti-US, anti-NATO, and is an anti-western organization in purpose (Uslu, 2007). 
DHKP/C’s ideology is similar to that of other radical Turkish leftists. The group believes 
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that the Turkish government is a fascist regime, controlled by the domineering, imperialist forces 
of the West, especially the United States and NATO. The group seeks to destroy these Western 
influences through violence and Marxist revolution. In its early years, when it was still known as 
Dev Sol, the group focused largely on political assassinations.  
A crackdown by Turkish authorities in the early 1980s forced the group to restrict its 
activities, though in the late 1980s Dev Sol was able to increase its attacks against Turkish 
military targets. Despite internal troubles, the DHKP/C has managed to retain the ideology and 
goals of the original Dev Sol movement. The group has continued to conduct violent attacks 
against Turkish government targets as well as against Western interests in Turkey. The group has 
also sought to bring attention to its imprisoned members by staging hunger protests.  
More recently, the group has been intensely outspoken against US military operations in 
Afghanistan and in Iraq. DHKP/C believes that these operations are proof of the imperialist 
intentions of the United States. According to DHKP/C, creation of a classless society and the 
establishment of the revolutionary power of the people are essential. DHKP/C defines the term 
the revolutionary power of the people as the power of all the people's forces that are against 
oligarchy and imperialism. DHKP/C still remains active in Turkey and in most European 
countries including Belgium Italy, Holland, Germany, Greece and France. Its main activities 
include assassinations, arson, and bombings.  
The Group’s most noticeable activities were the assassination of a former Prime Minister 
and a former Justice Minister in Turkey and an attempt to assassinate the U.S. President George 
Bush during his visit to Istanbul in 1992. The movement is mainly active in the universities 
among the socialist idealist students. DHKP/C is one of the two European leftist terrorist 
organizations that were included in the U.S. State Department Foreign Terrorist List and it is also 
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considered as a terrorist organization by European countries. 
DHKP-C’s Political Army Fighting strategy specifies using rural and urban guerillas in 
order to weaken the authority and prepare the environment for a possible revolution.  In 1992, 
Bedri Yagan was sent to the Bekaa Valley to start the guerilla training of the organization.  The 
party trained many of its members in this training camp to send to Turkey.  However after the 
1992 split, the activities in the Bekaa Valley stopped and then were closed down by 
administration.  Nevertheless, the organization today has some small armed-cells in big cities to 
plan and carry out some sensational actions. 
The strategies of DHKP/C are different from the other terrorist organizations because 
they tried to start a revolution in both the cities and countryside at the same time.  There are five 
stages in this revolution: 
 Vanguard war 
 Increasing vanguard struggle and starting a guerilla war 
 Growing and spreading guerilla war out of the country 
 Connecting to local units 
This situation would lead Turkey to the fifth stage, a victory of communist revolution.  In 
this strategy, although they believe that public support is very important to be successful, the 
army is the key element of revolution. 
They believe that the only way to strike down the imperialism and set up communism is 
an armed struggle.  The strategy of Devrimci Sol is the strategy of the People's War, which 
means they achieve power directly from the working people.  According to Mahir Cayan, the 
foundered of THKP/C, this strategy can be defined as: "The strategy which takes armed 
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propaganda as a basis and subordinates all other political, economic, and democratic forms of 
struggle to this basic form of struggle, is called the politicized-military war strategy" (Collected 
Works, 1995).  Therefore, DHKP/C depends on armed struggle; in other words, the army unit is 
the based organization of this terrorist organization.  
The main goal of DHKP-C is to overthrow the existing regime in Turkey and in its place, 
to set up a new regime based on Marxism and Leninism.  DHKP-C believes that the party is the 
pioneer organization that will lead the public on the way of Marxist-Leninist revolution.DHKP/C 
plans to start a people’s revolutionary war because of the belief that the only way to set up a 
communist government is through this war of the people to start to destroy the current 
government.  They believe that if the current government were destroyed, the communist system 
may be founded easily.   
Radical Terrorism 
Until the French revolution, religions had been believed to be the major factor which 
determines the people’s behaviors towards the authorities. Most of the religions, especially the 
celestial ones; Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, asked their members to conform to the teachings 
of their religious leaders. In fact, most of the authorities, in the west and east, were influenced by 
their religions in administrative issues. The French Revolution; however, was a turning point in 
this regard, transforming the classical religious state notion to the modern secular state in which 
the citizens have equal rights against the government. Marx, on the other hand, took the 
secularist approach one step further denying all kinds of religions and their informal regulations 
on the behaviors of the people against the authorities. To him, religion was a drug which 
inebriated people and helped them follow conformity encouraged by religion. With the spread of 
Marxism in the world, the religious movements, especially the Islamic movements, found 
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themselves in the defense of the religions as the Marxism was denying their religion. This caused 
a polarization between the people often living in the same country. Occasionally, this 
polarization was used to manipulate the religions through violence. Religions were sometimes 
used to spark independence movements and often used by the terrorist leaders to recruit and to 
spread their terrorism. This section of the literature review focuses on the issues related with the 
religion inspired terrorist movements. This starts with the definition of imperialism as it is 
frequently used in this literature and then the religions are studied for their approach to terrorism.  
Karl Marx, 1844 
Marxism emerged as a theory in response to the Industrial Revolution. There are three 
major aspects of the Marxist ideology including: philosophy, economics, and history. First, 
Marxism is an economic system in response to capitalism. Second, Marxism is a philosophy. 
Marxist philosophy is based on the ideas on human character and about how human beings 
function in the world. Marx is interested in the relationship between materialist and idealist 
philosophy (Smith, 2008). As a philosopher, Marx characterized a stem of philosophy called 
“dialectical materialism” to describe the materialist approach and human relations throughout 
history. In history, Marx studies the history of human kind and tries to prove how changed 
occurred as a result of struggles. In his theories, Marx defines religion as “the sigh of the 
oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions” 
(Komorzynski, 1897). Moreover, Marx calls for the demolition of any religion for the happiness 
of the society. He says that “the abolition of religion as the illusory happiness of the people is the 
demand for their real happiness” (Komorzynski, 1897). To call on them to give up their illusions 
about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illusions. The 
criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of which religion 
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is the halo” (Marx, 1887). 
Therefore, Marxism opposed any religion including Islam and other celestial religions, 
Judaism and Christianity. In an effort to follow Marx’s ideas, in the Soviet Russia and its 
followers around the world especially in the Easter Europe, the religions were harshly targeted, 
they were forbidden, the temples were closed and the holy books were burned. The newly 
emerged Communist Regimes completely prohibited religions and most of the time killed almost 
all of the religious leaders to ensure the decease of religions. The Communists extended a true 
war campaign against any religions in the eyes of the whole world as they were establishing their 
states. Many people suffered from these despot campaigns especially in the early establishments 
of the Communist States. 
Most of the people who suffered from the Communist brutality against religion were the 
Muslims. There were many Muslims in the newly emerged Communist States and they quickly 
became the enemy of those states. Seeing this cruelty against their same religion brothers and 
sisters, the Muslim world interpreted Marxism as one of the greatest enemy causing a deep 
polarization between the Marxists and Muslims. Several Muslims felt hatred against the Marxists 
as they saw or read what happened to people under those regimes. Consequently, the Communist 
War against religion caused a deep contradiction and polarization between the Muslims and 
Leftists.  
This contradiction led to radicalism among some communities as they believed they had 
to do something but they were not able to. In this regard, sometimes regional violent activities 
were a response to communism. In addition to regional activities, some people went overseas or 
abroad in an effort to help the people who were suffering under the communists. Consequently, 
this polarization and hatred caused radicalization among some Muslims. The recent Soviet 
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invasion of Afghanistan illustrates this point. Many people went to Afghanistan to help the 
Afghan Mujahideen in their fight against Soviet Russia. Unfortunately, sometimes good 
intentions and feelings were radicalized due to the harsh conditions of war by the extremists who 
were also fighting. When added with inadequate education and disconnection from the rest of the 
world, the former warriors against the Soviets were so ready to extend their war against new 
enemies. 
A regional example comes from the Turkish Hezbollah in this sense. When the leftist and 
ethnic terrorist organization PKK emerged in the southern part of Turkey, the people living in the 
region who were targeted by the PKK formed a religious based terrorist organization with the 
sole aim of fighting against the leftist PKK. They considered themselves an enemy of 
Communism and tried to struggle with the PKK just because it was a leftist terrorist organization 
harming their society both ideologically and physically. However, this organization again could 
not draw lines for its activities and after a period of time the enemy list began to rise and they 
started to target other people. The Turkish Hezbollah, being only the exclusive enemy of the 
PKK, soon began to carry out attacks against the government forces and civilians.  
Dictatorships in Muslim Countries 
Almost, all of the countries in the Middle East and some of the other Muslim countries 
are governed by brutal dictators most of whom were granted authority through their fillies by 
their colonial powers after the First World War. Moreover, those dictators have enjoyed widely 
support from the modern world including the west and the United States. In fact, some of them 
are still considered the puppets of their old colonial regimes. In addition to this support, these 
dictators failed to represent the majority of the people they are governing as most of the times 
those dictators happen to be from a small minority group just like Saddam Hussein in Iraq or 
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Hafiz and Bessir Assad in Syria. Often those dictators opposed and suppressed their own people 
through their secret services, police and military. Moreover, the people under those regimes 
usually did not have some of the basic rights that the western world provides to its citizens. Even 
today, the image of Middle East in the world is disappointing. When the term “Middle East” is 
stated, people out of the “Middle East” thinks about either a ruler in luxury and dissipation, who 
is at the same time a despot, blood-thirsty president constantly oppressing his people and at the 
same time who is corrupted with the misuse of the oil revenues and foreign aid that was 
generously given to him or the Palestinian-Israeli conflict (Aras & Tokta, 2007). 
Most people in the Middle East usually feel frustrated because of two reasons. First is the 
support of the western world to their dictators. Even though the western world including the U.S. 
always promoted democracy, it is a different story when it came to the Middle East. Most of the 
dictators enjoyed wide range support of the west especially military wise and politically. Seeing 
the support of the West and the United States, the people in the Middle East and some other 
Muslim countries became frustrated of the west. The people in the Middle East also become 
upset as they see the Western and the U.S. based military equipment used against them.  
The second disturbance comes from the unavailability of basic rights that are provided 
the states. Especially with the availability of the internet and cable or dish television networks 
and through the visits to the other countries, the people in the Middle East realize the broad 
rights and luxury the west and the U.S. people are enjoying. Even though most of the Middle 
East countries have ample resources through oil revenues, people believe that their dictators use 
the oil revenue for their own sake and security. Therefore, the people in the Middle East are 
frustrated from their rulers who do not represent them, from the open political and military 
backing and support of the U.S. and the West and from being unable to benefit of the oil 
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revenues. As a result of this frustration and common grievances in those societies, some terrorist 
and radical organizations have the opportunity and atmosphere of easily manipulating the people, 
especially the emotional youth, through their causes most of the time by using the religion 
(Diamond, Plattner, & Brumberg, 2003; Kaylan, 2005). 
Understanding Terrorism before Developing Coping Strategies  
One of the most important ways of understanding terrorism is understanding why people 
become terrorists. This question is as vast as the question of why people commit crime. Thus as 
opposed to delving into all possible explanations of becoming a terrorist, a more practical 
approach would be more pragmatic. Understanding the recruitment process of the terrorist 
organizations is a practical way to approach this issue. Through an understanding of the 
recruitment process and the subsequent employment and abuse of the terrorist organization 
members, coping strategies can be developed.  
The Modus Operandi of Recruitment: The Dynamic Terrorist Recruitment Model 
 
Although the literature on terrorist recruitment provided some insights about the methods 
of recruitment (Bloom; Faria, et al., 2005; Gates, 2006; Klein, 2005; Stahl, 2006; Wanous, 
1980), a general recruitment pattern is not supported by empirical evidence. Despite the large 
body of terrorism research on the psychological dimensions of terrorism and terrorists with 
regard to the root causes of joining terrorist groups and committing violence, only a limited 
number of researchers focused on the involvement process. In this regard, Klein (2005) suggest 
that it may be appropriate to investigate the involvement process rather than the psychological 
qualities of terrorists. Although the theory of which they spoke is not supported by research, they 
assert that important life events involving work, family, religion, and the like can pave the way 
to terrorism. Similarly, studies on risk assessment suggest that certain factors increase the 
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likelihood of involvement with terrorism (Jenkins, 2011; Miller & Mills, 2010; Wanous, 1980). 
Among these factors are social and economic conditions such as poverty, losses due to life 
events, and the like—factors that fall in line with previous studies. This study indicated that poor 
socioeconomic conditions are propagated by the terrorist organizations.  
Considering that both the terrorist organizations studied here are selective of certain 
individual characteristics, the potential recruit is passive at the first stage of recruitment. This 
finding contradicts Ross’s (2006) study regarding Al-Qaeda, mainly because Al-Qaeda has a 
larger recruitment pool as well as popular support. Additionally, Al-Qaeda appears to be an 
ideological movement rather than a small scale terrorist group. Therefore, there should be a 
demand for new recruits from the terrorist organization, since the potential recruit is passive. The 
demand for new recruits may, however, vary from time to time due to police operations, the 
political context of the country, and other external factors. For example, an organization may be 
reluctant to recruit new members during intense police crackdowns on terrorism. As mentioned 
by the TNP officers, for instance, some radical groups become popular at certain times 
depending on the political context of the countries. 
Under suitable conditions for recruitment, the terrorist organization contacts ideologically 
prone individuals through friends, relatives, or associations of the organization. The majority of 
DHKP/C and Hezbollah terrorists are recruited by their friends or relatives. Previous research is 
supportive of this point. Accordingly, Combs (2010) mentions that for the individuals who 
become active terrorists the initial connection is often made by a friend or a group. Similarly, 
(2006) mentions that people are recruited through kinship and friendship associations. People are 
influenced to join a terrorist organization by seeking solidarity with family, friends, or 
acquaintances (Martin, 2011).  
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Thus, in this reciprocal association between the terrorist organization’s agent and the 
potential recruit, the organization offers a sense of belonging, solidarity, self-esteem, and the like 
to the recruit through propaganda. Propaganda is a psychological process undertaken to influence 
the beliefs of a potential recruit. In this regard, ideology is used to justify the actions of the 
recruiter or the organization.  During this stage, the individual is informed about the organization 
over time. If the individual demonstrates his or her willingness to be in the organization, as this 
study indicated, the next stage of recruitment starts.  
The third stage of recruitment involves brainwashing and fostering ideological 
commitment. An individual is tested and expected to prove his or her dedication to the ideology 
and goals of the organization. This is one of the reasons why both DHKP/C and Hezbollah 
terrorists have higher criminal records; the terrorist group facilitates criminal activity. Terrorist 
organizations, in this stage, try to isolate individuals from their family and social groups in order 
to more easily impose their particular ideology. In this regard, it is essential to know the 
individual’s social and institutional ties in order to discern whether the involvement is an adverse 
outcome of weak ties, but this information is unavailable in the current study data sets.  
However, research on group dynamics in gangs suggests that potential terrorist recruits, 
like potential gang recruits, suffer from weak social and institutional ties, which in turn makes 
the individual more vulnerable for recruitment (Ness, 2007). Breaking the social and 
psychological ties of the potential recruits helps foster a consciousness of and investment in the 
collective movement and breed an inclination toward the terrorist organization. For example, a 
DHKP/C terrorist candidate is expected to participate in the Labor Day protests on May 1, follow 
the organization’s publications, and attend the organization’s meetings and activities. Terrorist 
groups, however, vary significantly from gangs due to the ideology factor in recruitment. 
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Ideology is an essential part of terrorist recruitment; the potential recruit comes to believe that 
the terrorist organization will remedy the existing problems both of the individual and the 
society. Ideology is like a holy book for the potential recruit, a resource that contains answers for 
every possible question.  
Eventually, if the performance of the potential recruit is observed to be sufficient by the 
terrorist recruiter, he or she will be asked to report his or her detailed personal information. The 
contact person will then report this information to the terrorist organization. The police-seized 
terrorist resumes and interviewees views confirm this process. 
In the final stage, depending on the organization’s recruitment decision, a potential 
recruit is accepted to or rejected from the terrorist organization. As the current research suggests, 
it is highly unlikely that an applicant will be rejected by the organization after the submission of 
personal information, because the candidate has already been observed to be qualified by the 
recruiter. At every stage of the dynamic recruitment model, variations in the individual’s and 
terrorist organization’s behaviors are possible (See Figure 1). 
In this recruitment approach, the terrorist organization plays the central role, because 
there should be a demand from the terrorist organization for recruitment regardless of how the 
potential recruit is motivated or what sorts of characteristics he or she holds. Recruitment to the 
terrorist organization is primarily a top-down process rather than a bottom-up process. This 
model may prove to vary, however, if the modus operandi of recruitment of other terrorist 
organizations is investigated. 
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Figure 1. The Dynamic Terrorist Recruitment Model
1
 
Conclusion 
Terrorism and non-traditional conflict have become a part of the daily life of Turkey and 
the Turkish National Police. The main problem with terrorism in Turkey is that there are no 
definite boundaries to what they might and might not do and who they are and who they are not. 
                                                 
1
 Adopted from Ekici (2006). 
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This study attempts to add to the understanding of the criminal mind of a terrorist and solve the 
puzzle of the effect of true belief on terrorist act. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Design and Methodology 
Introduction 
Nachmias & Nacmias (1996) explain that a researcher should clarify fundamental 
problems before starting a research project. These are as follows: who is being studied, what is 
observed, how the data is collected, and how the data will be used. This chapter provides a 
discussion concerning the research approach, research design, unit of analysis, data collection, 
hypothesis, and data analysis procedures. 
The research approach used in this study was secondary data analysis. Secondary data is 
any analysis of data collected by another researcher or organization for some other 
purposes(Hakim, 1987). The reason for the increased utilization of secondary data is its 
methodological advantages. In most general implementation, secondary data research the dataset 
is used to replicate the original research’s results or to address an entirely different question 
(Hakim, 1987).  
The main hypothesis of this study indicates that higher the sincerity of terrorists the 
higher the number of terrorist incidents and higher the violence levels. This study examines 
Turkey’s terrorism problem in depth by using content analysis method in light of a mixture of the 
mainstream crime theories and identifies some factors that are related to the formation of 
terrorism. It is believed that this may assist policy makers develop new policies that can 
eliminate fertile ground where terrorism easily finds support.  
To conceptualize the hypotheses the Content Analysis with the help of Integrated Crime 
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Theories approach will be used which can be described as a research method in which the theory 
is developed from the data, rather than the other way around. This approach makes this study an 
inductive approach. The study will be driven from the specific to the more general. Glaser and 
Strauss (1968) state that this method of study is essentially based on three elements: concepts, 
categories and propositions, or what was originally called “hypotheses”. However, concepts are 
the key elements of analysis since the theory is developed from the conceptualization of data, 
rather than the actual data. 
The data for the variables of demographic indicators were gathered from the databases of 
Turkish National Police Testimonial Reports of Terrorist Members. Statistical analysis and 
content analysis were utilized as a statistical method for this study in order to examine the 
relationship of sincerity level, and violence level of terrorist incidents. 
Mixed Crime Theories  
There are numerous theories in criminology striving to explain the concept of 
delinquency in quite different ways.   Since the 1960s the field has been dominated by a 
multitude of seemingly unrelated and competitive theories like anomie, social disorganization, 
differential association, social control, deterrence, labeling, ethnomethodology and conflict 
(Messner, Krohn, & Liska, 1989).   According to some criminologists this large number of 
theories has made the field seem fragmented (Messner, et al., 1989); most criminologists would 
agree that the large quantity of theories does not enrich the field but it becomes an obstacle for 
scientific progress (T. J. Bernard, 1990).   Recently, there is a trend in the field of criminology to 
reduce the number of numerous theories that creates confusion and reach a constructive solution.    
Some believe that the way to reduce this number is through falsification.   The idea is that 
the contradictory predictions of different theories can be subjected to competitive testing in 
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which research determines which predictions are supported by data and which are not.   Theories 
that are falsified as a result of this process can be discarded and in this way the number of 
theories can be reduced (T. J. Bernard & Snipes, 1996).   Others believe for a variety of practical 
reasons that the falsification process will fail since, as Bernard and Ritti (T. J. Bernard & Ritti, 
1990) indicated, simply, some theories cannot be falsified as there is no precise and exact 
statement of what the theory asserts.  Therefore integration is the alternative way to falsification 
to be taken in order to reduce the number of criminological theories (Vold, Bernard, & Snipes, 
2002).   
The current research findings in the form of criminological bits and pieces are 
unconnected to an overall theoretical structure or framework and this has lead some practitioners 
of the field to reach the conclusion that it is time to bring order to the field by drawing related 
lines of theoretical assumptions and empirical evidence together (Gibbons, 1994). The idea of 
theoretical integration is not only consistently reasonable but it also might assist the field of 
criminology to make sense of existing evidence and might indicate the linkages between 
theoretical arguments that have not been apparent (Gibbons, 1994).  However, no matter how 
logical the idea might be, integrating a couple of existing theories and creating a compound 
theory that would explain all the variances of the assumptions they included is not as easy as it 
sounds.   
The definition of crime is quick to change and its ambiguity makes it impossible to be 
thoroughly explained by a single theoretical framework.  Acts labeled as crime are so diverse 
that general theories can only explain similar phenomena.  The causes of crime are too complex 
to fit in a single theoretical perspective and that’s why efforts in the past toward a general theory 
of crime and the oppositional tradition failed (Elliott, Huizinga, & Ageton, 1985; Tittle, 1989).  
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There came a time where there was a clearly pressing need for theoretical development in order 
to explain a wide range of crime and therefore efforts were concentrated at theoretical integration 
(Messner, et al., 1989).  
Through integration and by using joint explanatory power of different crime theories this 
study seeks to answer the terrorism related research question. The literature suggests that crimes 
are mostly committed by people between the ages 13 and 24 and then start to decrease as the age 
increases (Farrington, 1986). Therefore, a measure of age is included in the research design. 
According to Merton (2003) and Messner and Rosenfeld (2003) when social institutions such as 
the family are weak in developing the social norms, anomie or normlessness ensues. Thus a 
measure of supervision is also included in the design.  
Besides, because of the lack of collective efficacy, communities become disorganized 
(Robert J.  Sampson, et al., 2003; Shaw & McKay, 2003) and when informal social control 
mechanisms (social bonds and self control) do not operate efficiently (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 
2003; Hirschi, 2003; Reckless, 2003) criminal behavior occurs. Thus measures of broken 
families (single female household, percent married population) and social disorganization 
(percent renters, percent living in urban areas) are added in the models. There are also theories 
that argue that males are more likely than females to engage in crime (Messerschmitt, 2003) and 
racial minorities are more likely to engage in crime (Anderson, 2003; Robert J. Sampson & 
Wilson, 2003).  
Content Analysis 
While theory integration is concerned with the discovery of hypotheses from texts, 
content analysis is concerned with testing hypotheses, usually, but not always, quantitatively. 
This requires (a) creating a set of codes, (b) applying those codes systematically to a set of texts, 
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(c) testing reliability of coders when more than one applies the codes to a set of texts, (d) 
creating a unit of analysis by variable matrix from the texts and codes and (e) analyzing that 
matrix statistically(H. R. Bernard, 2000).  
With the data collected from Turkish National Police this research aims to determine the 
presence of certain words or concepts that implies sincerity, fidelity, and alienation. Later, this 
study quantifies and analyzes the presence, meanings and relationships of such words and 
concepts, then makes inferences about the messages within the texts. Texts can be defined as 
testimonial reports of 3 different terrorist groups during their custody within TNP. To conduct a 
content analysis on any such text, the text is coded, or broken down, into manageable categories 
on a variety of levels--word, word sense, phrase, sentence, or theme--and then examined using 
one of content analysis' basic methods: the conceptual analysis.  
According to Krippendorff (2004), six questions must be addressed in every content 
analysis, and this study aims to find address these questions as well as the relationship with the 
sincerity and terrorist activity:  
Which data are analyzed? 
How are they defined? 
What is the population from which they are drawn? 
What is the context relative to which the data are analyzed? 
What are the boundaries of the analysis? 
What is the target of the inferences? 
Data Collection 
500 different terrorists’ testimonial reports are collected from Turkish National Police 
database between 1999 and 2006 randomly. These cases represent most of the terrorist groups 
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such as PKK, Hezbollah, Ibda-C, Dev-Sol and Al-kaide.  
The corpus of texts will be these 500 testimonial reports. 
Unit of Analysis will be individual cases from terrorist groups.  
Intercoder reliability will be tested with another Turkish coder, the idea is to see whether 
the constructs being investigated are shared whether multiple coders reckon that the same 
constructs apply to the same chunks of texts.  
Hypotheses 
H1: There is a positive relationship between sincerity and level of violence.  
 Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this hypothesis 
based on the variables “Sincerity Level’ and “Violence Level”.   
H2: The more educated terrorist has the more violent terrorist activities. 
 Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this hypothesis 
based on the variables “Education’ and “Total Score”.   
H3: Males are the more likely to have more violent activities than the females.  
Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this 
hypothesis based on the variables “Gender’ and “Total Score”.   
H4: Singles are the more likely to have more violent activities than the married terrorists.  
Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this 
hypothesis based on the variables “Marital Status’ and “Total Score”.   
H5: Separatist group members are more likely to have more violent activities than the Leftists 
and Religiously Motivated terrorists.  
Data collected by Turkish National Police (1996-2006) will be used to test this 
hypothesis based on the variables “Type of Terrorist Group’ and “Total Score”. 
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Methodology 
 The research approach used in this study is based on official data. The official statements 
of terrorists are used as secondary data. Secondary data has some methodological and practical 
advantages like availability, low cost and large sampling. 
 Based on official data, a cross-sectional research design is employed in this study. The 
relationship between several relevant variables is examined using multivariate statistical analysis 
techniques. 
 The unit of analysis in this research design is the terrorist group member individuals. 
There are a total of 500 individuals examined in the data set. These individuals are convicted 
terrorists or terror suspects that are either candidate or veteran terrorists. 
Variables 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable in this study is a measure of the activities done by the terrorists. 
This is a limited continuous variable ranging from the less violent activity to the most violent 
activity. The terrorists’ criminal actions have been classified into categories. These categories 
were based on their own statements, which they gave to the Counter Terrorism Department 
during the interrogation after they were captured. Based on the terrorists’ own statements, which 
were taken by the Counter Terrorism Department when they were captured, their criminal 
actions were classified into categories and thus the first part of the variable is formed. 
A score is assigned to each terrorist depending on his or her activity in the organization. 
This will allow to make comparisons among terrorists.  Each terrorist also gets scores from their 
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activities in order to compare them to each other. For every year within the groups they will be 
scored by 10 points. If the terrorist has been in the organization for 5 years he or she will get 50 
points, plus his or her terrorist activities will be count as each killing is 10 points, or each 
kidnapping is 6 points. This gives the researcher an opportunity to compare the new member to 
an older one. 
 
Figure 2 Measure of Terrorist Activity 
 
As shown in Figure 1, the more violent and the more intense the activities, the higher the 
score of the terrorist. 
Content Analysis 
 This study uses content produced from terrorist statements and examine the content  
by analyzing relevant incidents and acts in order to identify the common themes of violence and 
various aggravated levels of criminal acts perpetrated with a view to achieve terrorist groups 
political or other goals. All statements within the data set were included in the content analysis. 
The unit of analysis is terrorist statements for the content analysis procedure.  
All statements were coded according to four types of information: basic crime category, 
terrorist organization, individual factors, and modus operandi. 10 coders from the Turkish 
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National Police seeking masters of PhD degree attending several colleges and universities in the 
U.S. were selected for the coding process. Preferably, coders who previously worked at the anti-
terror department in Turkey were selected.  
In order to determine the level of violence the modus operandi of the criminal acts subject 
to legal action were examined for concrete actions such as use of firearms, possession of 
firearms, drug dealing for monetary gain for the organization, murder, theft, bombing etc. While 
some statements comprised a single criminal act, others were linked with other crimes and other 
incidents. Thus, each case were given a code based on the date and place of crime lest some 
incidents are coded twice. A code is a type of score.  By assigning the same code to different acts 
of the terrorists, an analyst is ascribing the same and equal value to those acts.  
Independent Variables 
Sincerity Level 
One of the concerns of the previous studies on the psychological dimensions of the 
terrorists was whether terrorists are already abnormal individuals. Further research indicated that 
not all terrorists are criminals (Silke, 2003). Thus the question of why normal, non-violent 
individuals resort to violence when they become a member of the terrorist organization. If they 
start normal and later become violent then the personality traits of terrorists would be highly 
irrelevant. Studies show that terrorist groups do not specifically seek out criminals like gangs do 
(Jenkins, 2011; Klein, 2005; Lennings, Amon, Brummert, & Lennings, 2010; Miller & Mills, 
2010; Stahl, 2006),  and obviously the group’s normative structure facilitates criminal activity.   
In that sense, organizational attachment and blind adherence are left as an explanation. 
Sincerity in this study is used as a measure of attachment and adherence.  Sincerity variable is 
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derived from the statements with content analysis technique. If the terrorist is mentioning the 
Turkish Government as different country and feels like he or she does not belong to it, s/he is 
considered as sincere, otherwise he or she will be considered as insincere. If the person does not 
fall into any category, he or she will be treated as ambiguous.  
Recruitment and Group Related Variables 
The question of how and through whom individuals contact terrorist organizations and 
become a member has been one of the concerns of the existing terrorism literature. Terrorist 
groups’ social networks, as well as individuals’ close circles are believed to play an important 
role in recruitment process. In this regard, as a similar group in terms of their group dynamics, 
associations in youth gang groups play a central role in becoming involved with the criminal 
group. For instance, having delinquent peers and having an existing family member in the gang 
were some of the statistically most reliable indicators of gang involvement. Studies indicate that 
terrorists extensively use social networks for recruitment(Crenshaw, 1998; Ekici, 2006; Laqueur, 
1999; Silke, 2003). Friendship and family networks as well as legal organizational associations 
are the major tools used by terrorist organizations to reach out to potential recruits (Ekici, 2006). 
Length of membership in the Group 
This variable is a self-reported continuous variable. 
Reason for Joining the Group 
This is a nominal variable broken into dichotomus variables. In the interview the 
terrorists are asked to choose between 5 choices for reasons for joining the group (just curiosity, 
personal motivations, socialization, inadequate family supervision, low income). As a reference 
group personal motivations is left out. 
Status 
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This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is convicted (value is zero). 
The other group is candidate (value is 1). 
Separatist 
This is dichotomous variable where the reference group is Leftist/Radical (value is zero). 
The main group is separatist (value is 1). 
Socio-demographics 
Education Level 
Education level is a categorical variable where the lowest category signifies lowest level 
of education. This variable ranges from 1 to 5. 
Age 
This variable is a continuous variable and calculated as of the date of the interview. 
Gender 
This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is females (value is zero).  
Marital Status 
This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is non-married (value is zero).  
Occupational Status 
This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is non-working (value is zero).  
Economic Status 
This is a categorical variable. where the lowest category signifies lowest level of 
education. This variable ranges from 1 to 5.  
Ethnicity 
This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is Turk (value is zero).  
Religious Affiliation 
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This is a dichotomous variable where the reference group is Sunni (value is zero).  
Conclusion 
This study will examine the correlates of the level of violence in terrorist actions based 
on individual level data collected officially. The following sections reports the results of the 
statistical analyses based on the above outlined methodology. 
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Chapter 4 
Statistical Analysis 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the research findings of the current study. The general strategy in 
presenting the results is to report descriptive statistics, and interview results for each piece of 
information obtained. Interview results are reported when relevant information is available. 
Multivariate statistics are presented at the end of the section for the impact of sincerity on 
terrorist activity across the various terrorist groups that operate in Turkey.  
Basic descriptive statistics for the variables used in this section are given in Table 2. 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable 
     Terrorist Activity 500 160.86 219.55 1.00 1150 
Explanatory Variable           
Sincerity 500 0.009 0.383 -1 1 
Control Variables   
    Age 500 22.994 18.391 17 58 
Gender (male) 500 0.817 0.387 0 1 
Marital Status  500 0.708 0.456 0 1 
Level of Education 500 0.385 0.751 1 5 
Occupational Status 500 0.509 0.738 0 1 
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Ethnicity (Kurdish) 500 0.217 0.567 0 1 
Religious Affiliation (Alevi) 500 0.301 0.497 0 1 
Economic Status 500 0.459 0.674 1 5 
Length of Membership 500 19.744 21.425 1 45 
Curiosity 500 0.196 0.674 0 1 
Socialization 500 0.246 0.525 0 1 
Inadequate Supervision 500 0.178 0.298 0 1 
Low Income 500 0.312 0.502 0 1 
Status (Convicted) 500 0.478 0.389 0 1 
Separatist 500 0.413 0.367 0 1 
 
Characteristics of the Terrorist Group 
The interviews showed that the most of the candidate and convicted terrorists are males 
with a percentage of 81%. Most of the terrorist organizations in Turkey have many legally 
established youth clubs and culture houses that provide social environments and activities for 
high school and college level students, where students from the opposite sex meet and establish 
new relationships. The study samples also showed that the majority of the terrorists are 
ethnically Turks. Convicted terrorists were found to be predominantly Turkish (89%), whereas 
the Turks made up only 55% of the candidate terrorists.  
While ethnicity is not a determinant factor in the selection process for some terrorist 
organizations, PKK solely recruits Kurds. While by itself not an ethnical affiliation, being an 
Alevi in terms of religious belief is also considered as a separate ethnical group as this faith is 
followed only by a certain group. Due to the difference in their religious beliefs and due to the 
notion that they are being discriminated against, Alevi community members are ideal recruits for 
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terrorist organizations. 
Some terrorist organizations abuse the Alevi community as a tool for their goals due to 
the left-oriented worldview of this community. In some cases, even those who are not Alevi are 
shown as Alevis by the terrorist organizations when they are killed in terrorist attacks or 
police/military operations. Organizations agitate Alevi community during the terrorist funerals. 
They publicize that the Alevi community in Turkey is suppressed and discriminated against. 
Thus, the Alevi community becomes more prone for new recruits.  
One of the common characteristics of the candidate and convicted terrorists is their 
marital status. Eighty-eight percent of the candidate terrorists and 67% of the convicted terrorists 
were never married. In most terrorist organizations, marriage is only allowed for camouflaging 
purposes, which is generally referred to as “revolutionary marriage” inside the organizations.  
Statistics show that the majority of terrorists have chosen to move from their original 
birthplace to another city. Sixty percent of the candidate terrorists and 79% of the convicted 
terrorists moved from their original birth place to the big cities to improve their quality of life, 
especially for job and education opportunities.  
When we look at the statistics, we observe some differences between convicted and 
candidate terrorists in terms of several attributes. Candidate terrorists are more educated with 
37% university or higher education than convicted terrorists are with 11%. In terms of job status, 
most of the convicted terrorists have a full-time or part-time job compared to candidate terrorists 
(56% and 14% respectively).  
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Table 2 Characteristics of the Candidate and Convicted Terrorists 
 
Statistical Analyses 
 While descriptive statistics tell a lot, when it comes to causal relationships they maybe 
misleading, or simply cannot go beyond the obvious. As the name suggests descriptive statistics 
merely describes what is in hand but when we are interested in determining relationships 
between two variables and single out spuriousness out of the link, we need multivariate statistical 
analyses. 
 Before deciding on the final models, regular multiple regression diagnostics for outliers, 
non-linearity, heteroskedasticity, and multi-collinearity were completed using appropriate 
 
Characteristics 
 
Candidate Terrorists 
 
Convicted Terrorists 
 
Male (%) 
 
67 
 
83 
Turk (%) 51 88 
Alevi (%) 92 81 
Never married (%) 88 67 
Mobility (%) 60 79 
Education (%) 
Primary and less 
Secondary and high  
University and upper 
 
13 
 
41 
55 51 
31 9 
Job status (%) 
Full-time or part-time 
Temporarily not working 
Unemployed 
Other 
 
13 
 
51 
30 17 
51 17 
5 15 
Type of job doing (%) 
Physical/labor 
Office work 
 
69 
 
82 
31 18 
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procedures.
2
 Since age and years spent in the organization were highly correlated and thus 
created a collineraity problem, age was not included in the analyses due to high collinearity.
3
 
Table 3 Regression Analysis of Terrorist Activity Index 
 Model -1 
Bivariate 
Model -2 
Recruitment 
Model -3 
Full Model 
Explanatory Variables Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
Sincerity 0.38*** 
(0.06) 
0.31*** 
(0.06) 
0.29*** 
(0.06) 
Control Variables 
   
Length of Membership 
 
0.13 
(0.28) 
-0.01 
(0.24) 
Curiosity 
 
0.16 
(0.1) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
Socialization 
 
0.21 
(0.15) 
-0.12 
(0.18) 
Inadequate Supervision 
 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
Low Income 
 
0.03 
(0.1) 
-0.06 
(0.1) 
Separatist 
 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
Age 
  
-0.11 
(0.08) 
Gender (male) 
  
-0.01 
(0.05) 
Marital Status  
  
-0.21 
(0.12) 
                                                 
2
 No influential cases were detected in all of the models. Partial regression plots revealed linearity in models. As 
mentioned in tables robust standard errors were estimated to correct for heteroskedasticity. 
3
 In cases when the variance inflation factor (VIF) is less than 10 and/or the tolerance (1/VIF) is larger than .1, no 
multi-collinerarity is assumed (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980; Greene, 2003). 
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Level of Education 
  
0.34*** 
(0.14) 
Occupational Status 
  
0.86** 
(0.31) 
Ethnicity (Kurdish) 
  
-0.01 
(0.24) 
Religious Affiliation (Alevi) 
  
-0.4 
(0.24) 
Economic Status 
  
-0.04 
(0.24) 
Status (Convicted) 
  
0.39* 
(0.18) 
Constant 4.79 
(6.17) 
-4.04 
(5.41) 
7.54 
(4.04) 
N 500 497 492 
F 57.25*** 49.99*** 22.11*** 
R
2
 0.77 0.76 0.52 
Significance levels based on a one-tailed test: *** p < .001, **   p < .01, *   p < .05.  
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
Results 
The cross-sectional data analysis results show that as sincerity increases the level of 
violence also increases. Thus, the main alternative hypothesis that whether sincerity affects the 
level of terrorist action is retained.  
Also the regression analysis shows that the more educated a terrorist is the more intense 
the level of violence that she or he would exercise. The results show no significant relationship 
between males and females and between singles and married terrorists in terms of level of 
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violence.  
Another important result is that there is a significant relation between the type of terrorist 
group and the level of violence. Separatists are more violent than Leftists or Radical Islamists. 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion, Implications, & Recommendations 
Summary and Discussion of Key Findings 
This chapter discusses the major findings of the current research for the terrorist 
organizations in Turkey and offers a model that summarizes the attachment to the organization. 
A comparison of terrorist groups in Turkey in terms of their recruitment dynamics has shown 
some common recruitment and attachment to the organization patterns. Based on the research 
results a theoretical explanation using the principles of theory integration is given for the results 
of the study. Recommendations and policy implications are mentioned at the end of this chapter. 
A Theory of Terrorist Recruitment and Attachment in Turkey 
 Terrorism can flourish as long as new recruits are added to terrorist organizations. 
Therefore, the future of terrorism depends on a successful terrorist recruitment and continuation 
of the attachment to the organization. The current study found important correlates for terrorist 
recruitment, as well as the process and the decision making of terrorist organizations in 
recruitment. Also how the sincerity of the organization members affect their attachment to the 
terrorist organization is tested. Before discussing the findings regarding each of the research 
questions, a few points should be clarified. 
First, the recruitment process of the terrorist organizations is predominantly informal. 
Despite the submission of personal information to the terrorist organizations as an indicator of 
formal recruitment process, there is no formal cutoff point during acceptance to the organization. 
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Recruitment is a long process that requires consistent commitment to both violent and nonviolent 
group activities. After months or years of involvement with the terrorist group an individual is 
accepted to the cell house of the terrorist organization.  
The second point is the freedom of choice in recruitment. The question of whether 
terrorist recruitment is a result of popular and unshakable support for terrorist activities or is an 
involuntary choice due to coercive external socioeconomic conditions is the main question here. 
The results of this research show that freedom of choice in recruitment thus sincerity should be 
accepted as the general rule, because there are many opportunities available to avoid joining the 
terrorist organizations. One piece of evidence for such freedom of choice in recruitment can be 
derived from the high percentages of mobility among Hezbollah terrorists. Those not 
volunteering to join the terrorist groups migrated to the western parts of Turkey from the 
Hezbollah and the PKK operating areas in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country 
(Ekici, 2006).  
Third, without an opportunity to access the terrorist group, an individual cannot become a 
terrorist (Silke, 2003). An opportunity for accessing a terrorist organization can occur in two 
ways. A terrorist candidate must identify an accessible avenue into the group, or else the terrorist 
organization has to make that opportunity available to new members through various ways. If 
using the first method, an individual faces several risks and difficulties. First, terrorist groups 
almost always operate underground. Therefore, it is difficult to search them out. Second, even if 
a candidate can find an avenue to the terrorist organization, he or she risks coming across the 
wrong people or security forces. If using the second method, however, the terrorist organization 
can use a legal political or social organization to make contact, which is more efficient when the 
candidate shares the same ideology with the terrorist group and possesses the desired 
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characteristics. Candidate terrorists must demonstrate their commitment to the organization’s 
goals and ideology by participating in various illegal activities such as protests.  
Implications, Limitations and Future Research 
This study used self reports (interviews). Self reports are useful when the researcher 
attempts to collect detailed information about individuals and the sociological, psychological, 
and environmental factors that affect an individual’s behavior (Thornberry & Krohn, 1994); 
however, it is commonly believed that self reports have many flaws, such as under- or over-
reporting, response falsification, bias-associated recall errors, the testing (interview) effect, and 
so on. Having mentioned the general limitations of self reports, the limitations of the data used in 
this research need to be considered as well. The interviews contain limited information therefore 
the reasons why terrorist organizations preferred certain individuals or what kinds of criteria they 
used for recruitment decisions are not precisely known.  
One of the concerns of social sciences is generalization. Although current research 
collected samples from different regions of Turkey where terrorist groups operate actively, there 
are many other locations from which samples can be collected. Similarly, the ability to 
generalize the findings of this research to other terrorist groups operating in different countries 
needs to be investigated.  
Policy Implications 
Terrorism is still one of the major challenges the contemporary world faces today. 
Governments, policy makers, and other stakeholders have great difficulty identifying effective 
legal mechanisms for fighting terrorism, mainly because of uncertainties regarding both the 
targets and offenders of terrorist acts.  
According to the literature on terrorism, there is no single policy paradigm for 
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counterterrorism. Among the policies offered include hardening potential terrorist targets, 
punishing terrorist acts for deterrence, and gathering information regarding terrorists and terrorist 
networks through intelligence-based interventions.  
 However, as mentioned before, due to the limitations of terrorism research, evidence-
based policies are rare. For instance, some researchers made comparisons between the GDP 
(Gross Domestic Product), the educational level of a country, and the number of terror incidents 
or active terrorist groups to identify working policies against terrorism. Despite the fact that 
these studies might offer some insight, types of terrorist activity, profiles, and ideologies vary. 
Therefore, there is a demand for micro-level studies in order to develop effective policies. 
 The current research is a micro-level study that attempts to identify effective policies 
against main terrorist groups from Turkey. Because terrorists groups vary in their tactics, target 
selection, and ideologies, understanding attachment and further preventing recruitment to 
terrorist groups is believed to be one of the most effective terrorism prevention methods. To this 
end, this study suggests macro-level implementations that can be employed  by the government 
and micro-level implementations that can be used  by law enforcement agencies to prevent 
terrorism and terrorist recruitment.  
 This study suggests two types of policy implementations. The first is to improve 
socioeconomic conditions so that people will be less vulnerable to terrorist recruitment, a tactic 
that requires the identification of risk groups. The second is to detect terrorists and their 
networks, a tactic that requires the use of different types of intelligence and preventive 
interventions in the locations that terrorists primarily use for recruitment. The former 
implementation is a long-term and large-scale project, whereas the latter one is a short-term, 
small-scale project that appears to be more promising. The two are, however, interrelated. 
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Simply implementing the second tactic could prevent terrorism, but in the absence of the first 
tactic, terrorist groups will likely find other fertile ground in which to flourish. 
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Appendix 1 
Questionnaire 
1- What is your age? 
2- Where were you born? 
3- What is your gender? 
A – Male  B - Female 
4- Your marital status 
A – Single  B – Married  C - Divorced 
5- What is your level of education? 
A - Secondary (lower, incomplete) 
B - Secondary 
C - Higher (incomplete) 
D - Higher 
E - Candidate of Sciences 
6- Occupation/Profession _____________________________________ 
7- Occupational category 
A – Employed B - Unemployed 
8- What is your ethnicity? 
9- How many siblings do you have?  
10- How would you describe your family's economic situation? 
A- Very Poor  B- Poor  C- Average 
D- Rich  E- Very Rich 
11- What is your family’s political background? 
A- Left wing  B- Right wing close to center 
C- Center  D- Left wing close to center 
E -Left wing 
12- What is your terrorist organization that you were belong to? 
A- DHKP/C (Left) B- Turkish Hezbollah (Right) 
C- PKK (Separatist) 
13- Do you have any relatives who work in the police or army force? 
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A- Yes  B- No 
14- Do you have valid passport 
A- Yes  B- No 
15- Have you ever been abroad?  
A- Yes  B- No 
16- Can you speak any foreign language? 
A- Yes  B- No 
17- Do you know how to use a gun? 
A- Yes  B- No 
18- Where did you get in touch with terrorist organization at first? 
A- School 
B- Family gathering 
C- Religious Compound 
D- Prison 
E- Political meeting or event 
F- Other (Please explain)………………………………………. 
19- What was your relation to the person who gets in touch with you at first? 
A- Friend 
B- Relative 
C- Clergy 
D- Teacher 
E- Other (Please explain)………………………………………. 
20- What was the gender of the person who gets in touch with you at first? 
A- Male  B- Female 
21- What was age of the person who gets in touch with you at first? 
22- How did the recruiters contact with you? 
A- Individually 
B- Newspaper advertisements 
C- Internet 
D- Friend/relative advice 
E -Other (Please explain)………………………………………. 
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When did you get in touch with the organization initially? 
23- What was your age? 
24- Which season 
A- Autumn  B- Winter 
C- Spring  D- Summer 
25- Daytime or nighttime? 
A- Day Time  B- Night Time 
26. What was the basic reason that causes you to go with terrorist organization? 
A- Just curiosity  
B- Personal motivations (i.e. ego, sex or the lust for power) 
C- Socialization from peers or the organization 
D- Inadequate supervision of family 
E- Low income 
F- Other (Please explain)………………………………………. 
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